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**UNDERSTANDING CULTURE AND CONSENSUS BUILDING:  
REQUISITE COMPETENCIES FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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Military personnel need to develop new requisite competencies to successfully implement the national security strategy. Today, whether military personnel are assigned to staffs in Washington, D.C. or operating in a geographic area of responsibility, they will be routinely involved in interagency operations. The diversity of governmental and nongovernmental agencies involved in interagency operations, each agency having its own culture, makes unity of effort difficult. This problem of diversity between participating organizations, compounded by low technical and procedural commonality together with the absence of concordant interests, create significant obstacles to effective interagency coordination. Military personnel must develop a better understanding of the inherent complexity of interagency operations to be effective. Understanding the culture of governmental and nongovernmental organizations is a key competency for successful interagency operations. With the knowledge of the participating organizational culture comes the empowerment to effect consensus. Consensus building allows personnel to move their represented disparate organizations toward an acceptable strategic concept. The thorough investigation and understanding of organizational cultures coupled with the deliberate methodology of applying that knowledge toward achieving consensus on acceptable multi-agency concepts is the foundation of effective interagency operations. The associated tactics, techniques, and procedures should be incorporated into joint and service doctrine.



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## **UNDERSTANDING CULTURE AND CONSENSUS BUILDING: REQUISITE COMPETENCIES FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS**

Carnes Lord, a former NSC staff member, highlights this incongruence: "What has perhaps been most neglected is the impact on national-level decision-making of the institutional fragmentation and lack of communication that characterizes the national security bureaucracy outside of Washington." This fragmentation is aggravated by diverse agency cultures, philosophies, goals, organizational mismatches, political agendas, and competing policies that all serve to impede voluntary cooperation.

—Colonel Edward J. Filiberti

Increasingly, military personnel are conducting operations with U.S. governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Although these non-military governmental and nongovernmental organizations have some similarities with military organizations, the differences are profound. Unfortunately, service and joint doctrine do not address these differences in enough detail to enable military personnel to be effective in complex interagency operational environments. Adding to the complexity is the unique behavior of these civilian agencies. However, lessons learned from past interagency operations provide a basis for developing an effective doctrine for the conduct of interagency operations. Although, the process is complex, effective interagency coordination reduces to two key competencies: understanding the organizational culture and the ability to conduct consensus building. Military personnel must understand the differences between military and civilian agencies and must know where to find information regarding governmental and nongovernmental organizations. In addition, members of the armed forces must develop consensus-building techniques to deal with the disparate positions and complexity of the participating agencies. By understanding the culture of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and by developing consensus-building techniques, military personnel will be able to improve military effectiveness during interagency operations. The process of researching, studying, and understanding organizational cultures and the techniques of effective consensus building must be incorporated into service and joint doctrine.

### **THE WORLD HAS CHANGED**

A new world order brings with it a new range of crisis responses. In the past, the U.S. focus was the Soviet Union and the overarching doctrine of containment guided its actions. The use of national power was marked by clarity of purpose and well-defined roles and responsibilities of participating agencies.<sup>1</sup> Today, however, the national security strategy requires civilian and military agencies to work together to accomplish cross-agency tasks of

unprecedented complexity. Whether providing humanitarian assistance, combating transnational crime, or supporting peace operations, nearly every significant security undertaking demands comprehensive and unique interagency teamwork.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, today's national security environment finds our military personnel operating in the multi-agency arena because U.S. military forces are routinely committed to operations that depend upon nongovernmental organizations and other U.S. governmental agencies for success.<sup>3</sup>

Recent participation in domestic operations including counter drug, disaster relief, and counter terrorism reflect an increase in military operations involving multiple agencies and organizations. Since a growing number of US government agencies are operating overseas, the interagency aspects of future military operations will likely continue to increase.<sup>4</sup> Diplomatic, economic, and military issues have become convoluted and fused. These close linkages will continue to drive interagency operations.<sup>5</sup> The traditional sequential approach, in which the political powers hand off a mission to the military, the military performs the mission, and then military turns the mission back over to the political powers, is becoming more unlikely in this new national security environment.<sup>6</sup>

Success in today's national security environment requires the complex synchronization of all four instruments of power: political/diplomatic, economic/humanitarian, military, and psychological/informational. The challenge of interagency cooperation is to achieve sufficient consensus on the operational roles of each participating organization within a unifying concept to achieve national security objectives.<sup>7</sup> Interagency coordination goes beyond merely linking military and civilian efforts. It is not enough to have a point of contact where military staff can meet periodically with civilians in the area of operations. Coordination requires a balance of leadership and a degree of coordination by all agencies concerned at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.<sup>8</sup> Interagency coordination is complicated under the best of circumstances. The frequent conflicting personalities of the participants, disparate organizational cultures, and competition for scarce resources all increase the challenges.<sup>9</sup>

Interagency operations are pervasive but essential whenever the United States commits its armed forces to an operation. Agencies of the U.S. government develop policies and guidance in Washington, D.C. while elements from these same agencies are also present in the geographic area of responsibility.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, military personnel will be involved in interagency operations whether they are in Washington, D.C. or in the geographic area of responsibility. Furthermore, military organizations are often at the center of interagency activities because of their large planning staffs and their ability to respond quickly. Therefore, the provisions and facilities the military establishes for interagency coordination play a crucial role in overall

success.<sup>11</sup> Military personnel do not command or control governmental or nongovernmental organizations. Rather, the participants rely upon trust and mutual interests to obtain the interagency cooperation needed to meet mission objectives.<sup>12</sup>

### **THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS**

In today's national security environment, interagency working groups are the principal mechanism for formulating intergovernmental crises responses.<sup>13</sup> The Principals Committee is chaired by the National Security Advisor to the President and convened for only the most important matters. The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the Principals Committee. Consequently, military personnel must understand the interagency process to support the Chairman's role on the Principals Committee. Next, the Deputies Committee is chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor and conducts the routine business of the National Security Council system and serves as the crisis management cell. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the Deputies Committee. Finally, Interagency Working Groups are manned at the staff action officer level to work specific issues. Military personnel are directly involved in the process at the Interagency Working Group level.<sup>14</sup> At all levels, these committees/working groups are concerned with the coordination, integration, and supervision of strategic operations.<sup>15</sup>

Despite this framework, the diversity of governmental and nongovernmental agencies, each having its own culture and in some instances, disparate goals and objectives, makes unity of effort difficult. This problem of organizational discordance creates obstacles to interagency coordination.<sup>16</sup> Military personnel must understand both the similarities and the differences between the military and civilian agencies to overcome conflicting organizational differences. Unfortunately, service and joint doctrine does not address these differences in enough detail. Therefore, lessons learned from the actual conduct of interagency coordination can form the basis for identifying successful interagency coordination techniques. These lessons learned identify that the keys to success are understanding another agency's culture and the use of that knowledge to effect consensus.

### **CULTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES**

It is just as important to highlight that governmental and governmental agencies have similarities to the military, as it is to highlight the differences. For example, both governmental and nongovernmental agencies share the principles of a strong moral imperative, professionalism, and a respect for life.<sup>17</sup> In addition, despite the assumption that the Armed Forces and civilian agencies have different missions, their mutual goal is usually securing the welfare of the target population.<sup>18</sup> However, there are striking differences.

Military operations use established procedures and chains of command. The military has well defined processes and clearly delineated planning concepts synchronizing complex organizations towards common objectives. Civilian-run operations are less structured in terms of command and control and the relationships between their various echelons.<sup>19</sup> These differences are pronounced even in Washington, D.C. where there are differences in civilian and military agency internal procedures. For example, the Department of Defense has well-defined internal procedures and formats for both the deliberate planning and the crisis-action processes. On the other hand, the Department of State has no established format for issuing guidance while directing diplomatic strategies in support of the national strategy.<sup>20</sup> In the geographic area of responsibility, governmental and nongovernmental organizations appreciate that military forces can provide the first response to humanitarian emergencies. Generally, they understand and accept the key contribution of military forces of providing the security they need to extend the reach of civilian agency operations. Despite this appreciation, these civilian agencies must sometimes limit their cooperation with the military because that relationship may impede their access to certain areas or segments of the population. For this and other reasons, civilian organizations do not want to be perceived as extensions of military forces.<sup>21</sup> Military personnel must appreciate these and other similar concerns.

#### ABSENCE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Military activities are based upon doctrine that serves as a guide for conducting operations. Unfortunately, the multi-agency dimensions are not well addressed in military doctrinal publications.<sup>22</sup> The Army's field manual FM 100-5, *Operations*, describes the Army as competent in nation assistance, counter drug operations, security assistance and stability operations. However, it provides little insight regarding how to conduct these operations in coordination with governmental and nongovernmental agencies. In the chapter on "Operations Other Than War," FM 100-5 simply advises that commanders may have to seek, "an atmosphere of cooperation rather than command authority to achieve objectives."<sup>23</sup> The *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, Air Force Manual 1-1, summarizes aerospace doctrine in Volume 1 and contains essays on aspects of war and military activities short of war in Volume 2. Nowhere is the issue of interagency synchronization or coordination discussed.<sup>24</sup> Key Marine Corps manuals are FMFM1, *Warfighting*; FMFM 1-1, *Campaigning*; and FMFM 1-2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*. None specifically addresses interagency issues.<sup>25</sup> Naval Warfare Publication 11, *Naval Operational Planning*, describes a generic military planning process, but it does not address interagency planning. The Navy White Paper, *From the Sea*, lists one of Navy's new missions as peacekeeping.

However, it does not describe how the Navy will interrelate with other agencies in this new mission.<sup>26</sup> Lack of service doctrine led to the development of Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*.

Joint Publication 3-08 discusses interagency processes and players, the evolving role of the Armed Forces, and the functions of the National Security Council system. It also outlines principles for organizing interagency efforts at the operational level.<sup>27</sup> Although publication of joint doctrine was a welcome addition, it was not enough. Joint manuals generally did not adequately explain the differences between military and civilian agency operations.<sup>28</sup> However, lessons learned from past interagency operations outline the fundamental principles that military personnel should employ during interagency operations.

#### EMERGING INTERAGENCY DOCTRINE

The lessons learned from Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia are very informative when examining interagency operations. A central criticism of these past complex operations was that they lacked cohesion and unity of effort.<sup>29</sup> Recommendations included mutual awareness of competing organizational priorities and developing an understanding, at the working level, of the organizational bureaucracy. Both are prerequisites for closer cooperation and building unity of effort.<sup>30</sup> Cooperation between military and civilian agencies has frequently been effective at the lowest levels when people have come together to solve problems. A mutual understanding of the agencies' organizational cultures was key to bringing these people together.<sup>31</sup>

In Somalia the civil military operations center was effective, not for operational level coordination, but to bridge the gaps between military and civilian cultures. By developing good personal relationships, the staffs were able to alleviate the anxieties of the relief community.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, during operations in Haiti, ignorance of organizational cultures contributed to interagency discordance.<sup>33</sup> In Haiti, military personnel generally did not appreciate the interagency process and the challenges associated with dealing with dozens of diverse organizations. Conversely, civilians did not understand the military. Since most civil-military interagency participants met for the first time during the crisis, they often did not trust each other and did not know what to expect.<sup>34</sup> A better understanding of organizational cultures could have helped bring these organizations together.

#### CULTURE AND CONSENSUS BUILDING

Civilian and military personnel must foster an understanding of each other's culture during interagency operations.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, they must recognize that the interagency process is largely a political process because personal and institutional power is frequently at stake. Therefore, the interagency process also requires skill in consensus building.<sup>36</sup> To be

effective, military personnel must work to build positive relationships among governmental and nongovernmental agencies and their representatives. By understanding the participating civilian agencies' culture, the military can close communications gaps and help form the understanding and mutual respect needed for effective operations.<sup>37</sup> Thus, successful civilian-military operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will require new skills in collaboration.<sup>38</sup> Civilian and military agencies must reach consensus to efficiently develop and effectively execute major operations. This can be difficult for military personnel who are trained with skills that promote rapid decision-making in a hierarchical, mostly unicultural organization.<sup>39</sup>

## **UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES**

Training is required on the many types of civilian agencies that routinely participate in military operations. At the global level, the military needs to understand the United Nations. On the regional level, members of the armed forces need to have a basic knowledge of the functions of major organizations such as the European Union and the Arab league. Finally, the military must have an understanding of the numerous governmental and nongovernmental organizations that will participate in or be present during any major operation.<sup>40</sup> Even organizations that appear to be very similar to the military have unique differences. For example, while law enforcement agencies may be considered paramilitary organizations and have many similarities to the military, each has its own particular training focus, procedures and vocabulary.<sup>41</sup> Military personnel must understand the differences in command and control procedures, logistics, doctrine and ethics. These are just a few of cultural and organizational differences between the military and civilian agencies.

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Many nongovernmental organizations and U.S. governmental agencies are directed and controlled in a manner vastly different than the military. Military personnel must not attempt to dictate what will happen during operations involving other agencies but instead attempt to coordinate a team approach. In addition, military personnel generally cannot direct interagency cooperation among the other governmental and nongovernmental agencies.<sup>42</sup> If members of the armed force are insensitive to the need for coordination and voluntary cooperation among civilian agencies, they can create the negative perception that they are trying to usurp their authority and take over the operation. When analyzing the mission, an implied task should be to develop teamwork between civilian agencies and the military. In a sense, the military unit providing support should be "customer oriented" rather than "mission oriented." One primary condition for success should be that participating governmental or nongovernmental agencies are satisfied with the scope of their contributions.<sup>43</sup>

Another potential area of confusion between the military and some governmental agencies' control apparatus is the succession of command. For example, in military organizations, the succession of command works downward. If a military commander is unavailable, his second in command takes charge.<sup>44</sup> In many law enforcement agencies, the opposite is true. If the law enforcement agent is unavailable, the next person to contact is his or her boss. If an unexpected event happens during off-duty hours when the usual agent contact cannot be reached, military personnel should know whom to contact as an alternate and understand who in the law enforcement agency has the authority to make decisions.<sup>45</sup>

Unless military personnel understand the relationships between the military and governmental/nongovernmental organizations and the corresponding command and control relationships they may be ineffective in dealing with these organizations. Military personnel are accustomed to a hierarchical rank and position structure, which defines authority. This is not the case in operations involving many governmental and nongovernmental organizations.<sup>46</sup> When an explicit interagency chain of command does not exist, problem solving and decision-making may become problematic. Thus, consensus building may require compromises with multiple actors within the same U.S. governmental agency or nongovernmental organization.

Additionally, there is a tendency to see the development of command and control procedures during interagency operations as analogous to the development of command and control procedures during joint operations. This analogy suggests that just as joint command and control has replaced individual service command control during joint operations, overall interagency agency command and control will replace individual military and civilian agency command and control during operations requiring interagency coordination.<sup>47</sup> However, military personnel from different services have much more in common than do representatives from other U.S. governmental agencies or nongovernmental organizations. For example, nongovernmental organizations are usually not homogeneous. Moreover, these civilian agencies are usually reluctant to subordinate their priorities to those of other participating agencies because of inherent inconsistency between their organizational morays. For instance, some are politically based while others are politically biased; some are faith or advocacy based and most are constituency supported. Collectively they have no shared standards, organizational goals, or overarching vision to pull them together as do the Armed Forces.<sup>48</sup>

LOGISTICS

Military and civilian agency personnel have very different perceptions of logistics. The military is used to a long logistics chain designed to deliver massive amounts of food, fuel and equipment around the world. Material is typically organized into standard packages. Food is

prepared by military cooks or issued as meals-ready-to-eat. Most civilian agencies do not use this long, self-sufficient logistic chain. For example, law enforcement agency personnel usually buy their lunch at local restaurants and fuel at commercial gas stations. Generally, a law enforcement response to a logistic need is to locally purchase it, whereas the military usually requisitions supplies through the military logistics system.<sup>49</sup>

Military personnel should understand the advantages and disadvantages of its logistics system while engaged in interagency operations. The logistics system's advantage is its ability to provide all needed operational supplies and operate in remote areas for extended periods with minimum negative impact on local food and fuel stores. Additionally, the provisioning of military supplies to nongovernmental organizations can be a powerful tool in soliciting their cooperation. Conversely, nongovernmental organizations are able to operate "off the economy" much easier and thus are more flexible and less dependent upon lines of communication for support.<sup>50</sup>

#### DOCTRINE AND ETHICS

Military operations are based upon doctrine, which is intended to serve as a guide for the conduct of operations. In contrast, other U.S. governmental agencies and nongovernmental agencies typically do not have formal doctrine. Even the most organized usually only have rudimentary standard operating procedures.<sup>51</sup> In addition, military and civilian agencies may develop dramatically different operational approaches. For example, during humanitarian operations, the military seeks to stabilize the situation in the short term. It will establish a secure environment, set up temporary shelters, and begin performing required relief operations. These actions contribute to the humanitarian operation in the shortest amount of time. On the other hand, civilian organizations generally take a more long-term approach. They are frequently in the area well before the military and remain much longer. Therefore, civilian agencies are more interested in actions that provide long-term solutions to alleviate suffering during humanitarian operations.<sup>52</sup>

In addition to differences in doctrine and operating approaches, civilian and military agencies also have differences in their respective ethical codes. Informal contacts and the circumvention of standard operating procedures are usually frowned upon in the military. The "good old boy" network is considered inappropriate channels in the military. This is not the case in civilian agencies. For example, in law enforcement agencies the use of personal contacts is generally viewed favorably. The commodity becomes information and personal relationships rather than supplies. Networking is considered teamwork among law enforcement officers. Because it is contrary to the military culture, members of the armed forces often fail to

appreciate the importance of networking to the functioning of civilian agencies.<sup>53</sup> In operations involving interagency cooperation this cultural disparity can produce friction and dissention.

INFORMATION

There are numerous web sites for military personnel to review and develop a better understanding of the culture and capabilities of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. InterAction (<http://www.interaction.org>) is a coalition of over 150 nongovernmental organizations who are assisting in worldwide humanitarian efforts.<sup>54</sup> ReliefWeb (<http://www.notes.reliefweb.int>) is sponsored by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and offers up-to-date information collected from over 170 sources on emergencies and natural disasters.<sup>55</sup> Integrated Regional Information Network (accessible through ReliefWeb) provides daily and weekly information on regional problems of the Caucasus, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>56</sup> U.S. Agency for International Development ([www.info.usaid.gov/resources/](http://www.info.usaid.gov/resources/)) lists sites of those agencies and organizations involved in humanitarian and development activities around the world.<sup>57</sup> U.N. High Commission for Refugees ([www.unhcr.ch/](http://www.unhcr.ch/)) contains notes on refugee crises.<sup>58</sup> Greater Horn Information Exchange (<http://gala.ingo.gov/Horn>) features reports and analysis of east/central African nations in crisis.<sup>59</sup> Finally, Sphere Project (<http://www.ifrc.org/pubs/shpere>) is an attempt by a group of organizations to develop their version of a disaster assistance handbook.<sup>60</sup>

By reviewing these web pages, military staffs of deploying units can learn what civilian agencies are already in the objective area, make initial contact with their parent office, and get a more accurate picture of what is happening on the ground. Members of the armed forces will also have a better understanding of the capabilities and culture of the governmental and nongovernmental organizations involved in interagency operations.

This enhanced understanding of culture will directly contribute to the effective interagency cooperation that is vital to the success of operations. On the other hand, if the military does not learn how to work effectively with other U.S. governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations involved in the operation, they may find themselves pushed into non-military roles that will affect their ability to carry out their primary military tasks. Similarly, if U.S. governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations do not learn how to work with the military, they may find themselves inadequately protected in a hostile environment and unable to perform their intended agency tasks.<sup>61</sup>

Essential to effective interagency operations is determining which U.S. governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations share a significant common interest in the operation and which organizations are essential to its success.<sup>62</sup> Understanding ninety percent

of the organizations involved in the operation does nothing if the other ten percent have all the resources and capabilities critical to mission success. Moreover, military participants need to ascertain the minimally acceptable and optimal positions of these essential governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Their internal bureaucratic requirements have to be satisfied for them to cooperate during an operation.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, military personnel must determine their own minimally acceptable and optimal positions and be prepared to move to compromise positions when accommodating dictates of an important participating organization. Navigating through an iterative and dynamic negotiation dialogue with multi-cultural stakeholders towards a mutually acceptable concept becomes a practiced art termed - consensus building. Consensus building depends upon each participant's ability to internalize the perspective of participating organizations and to recognize and meet minimally acceptable positions of the most important organizations. Both role-playing and compromise are critical elements of consensus building.

### **CONSENSUS BUILDING**

Military personnel need to develop new competencies to be successful in interagency operations. Effective consensus building is the most critical requisite competency. The first step in developing consensus is garnering an appreciation of the scope and complexity of the missions confronting the multi-agency responders. Second, military personnel need to realize traditional communicative skills may not be appropriate when dealing with participating agencies. Third, the operating environment is itself dynamic, with conditions important to specific agencies fluctuating wildly thus making assessments uncertain and difficult. Fourth, consensus building involves dialogue, compromise, trust building, and role-playing rather than mere traditional discussion. Finally, members of the armed forces must establish a range of minimal acceptable and most desirable criteria from which to assess interagency outcomes.

### **UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION**

Military personnel cannot determine if consensus building is appropriate without first understanding what form(s) of coordination are likely to be performed by the interagency group.<sup>64</sup> Most interaction can be classified into three categories: generate, choose, and negotiate. "Generating" may involve brainstorming and agenda setting. Brainstorming is considered a creative activity while agenda setting is considered a planning activity. Both activities require idea "generation." "Choosing" may involve problem solving and decision-making. Problem solving is considered an intellectual activity that requires choosing a correct course of action while decision-making is considered a judgment activity that requires reaching consensus on a formulated course of action. However, both activities require "choosing." "Negotiating" may involve resolving conflictive viewpoints and resolving conflicting interests.

Resolving conflicting viewpoints is considered a cognitive conflict activity while resolving conflicting interests is considered a mixed-motive activity. Both activities require "negotiation."<sup>65</sup>

"Generate" activities are collaborative. The interagency group is not required to decide on a single best response during brainstorming or agenda setting. Each member of the interagency group can independently contribute ideas. Consensus building is not required of the members because there are minimal requirements for member interdependence.<sup>66</sup>

However, activities that fall within the "choose" category do require coordination. Intellective activities have demonstrably correct answers. Reaching agreement is straightforward because once the solution is recognized and understood there is little to debate.<sup>67</sup> The most logical option meeting the most important criteria usually prevails. On the other hand, judgment tasks do not have a correct answer. The interagency group must seek consensus on a preferred alternative that satisfies or is consistent with multi-agency perspectives. Judgment activities generally cannot be resolved through the presentation of factual information. The interagency group's choice on judgment activities necessarily requires consensus among the members.<sup>68</sup> The most compelling and convincing option reflecting most of the participants' perspectives usually prevails.

"Negotiation" activities are similar to judgment activities. These activities deal with conflicting viewpoints or interests. Therefore, resolving negotiation activities is highly dependent on the interagency group's ability to reach consensus.<sup>69</sup> Judgment activities and negotiation activities that resolve conflicting interests and differing viewpoints require a consensus building process.

#### TRADITIONAL SKILLS

However, traditional military communicative skills encourage a competitive approach that inhibits consensus building. The military processes are focused on "choosing" during an "intellective" staff planning activity. Generally, military decision-making focuses on identifying viable courses of action, selecting measurable criteria, and objectively analyzing each option. If dissension exists on relative advantages and disadvantages, members attempt to use verbal arguments to gain advantage over others. This competitive communicative discourse advocating a particular optimal approach is neither conducive nor applicable to productive consensus building.<sup>70</sup>

Traditional military competitive communicative approaches must be tempered by the requirements of consensus building. Certain communicative principles can facilitate consensus building. Carefully articulated and logically reasoned arguments for and against a given proposition usually lead to reasoned decisions.<sup>71</sup> However, option advocacy and agency bias

must yield to reasoned discourse and a willingness to expand the proposal to subsume most agency perspectives. Unlike traditional communicative skills, winning should not become the goal of the interagency members, who must rely on cooperation.<sup>72</sup> Effective interagency communicative skills require an informal and permissive exchange of ideas with the final decision being made by the most critical interagency members through mutual consent on an option satisfactory to all or most participating agencies.<sup>73</sup>

#### BENEFITS OF CONSENSUS BUILDING

Consensus building agreements can be reached among members of interagency operations who would not normally work together. Such agreements can be of higher quality than decisions made through other traditional methods. These agreements can be more durable because consensus building is less likely to produce unhappy or reluctant participants that otherwise might hinder operations. Agreements reached by consensus building are also more likely to be regarded as fair by all parties. The quality of these agreements is usually high because they tend to take into account the unique knowledge and contributions of each member of the interagency operation. Finally, consensus building is more likely to produce innovative ideas because it involves dynamic group dialogue.<sup>74</sup>

The outcomes of consensus building are both tangible and intangible. Tangible products can be easily recognized as agreements.<sup>75</sup> Intangible consequences are the establishment of interpersonal relationships of key organizational players that are built on trust. This trust helps to facilitate future problem solving. After a successful consensus building process, members of the interagency operations usually feel less hostile to each other's views, will be more likely to share knowledge, and will have developed a mutual understanding of each other's viewpoints and cultural perspectives.<sup>76</sup>

#### CONSENSUS BUILDING TECHNIQUES

Consensus building encompasses many types of techniques.<sup>77</sup> An effective process uses techniques that enable all members of the interagency operation to be heard and be informed. These techniques encourage dialogue that is both respectful and open-ended. The techniques discourage the taking of positions. Effective consensus building develops a shared understanding of how to deal with the uncertainty and complexity associated with impending operations.<sup>78</sup>

Role-playing is another effective technique for consensus building. Role-playing during consensus building allows members of the interagency operation to let go of organizational or self-imposed constraints and to develop new ideas.<sup>79</sup> Through role-playing, members of the interagency operation assume the perspective of another member's organization.<sup>80</sup> Role-

playing can sometimes move participants through organizational impasses.<sup>81</sup> It can also encourage members of interagency operations to move beyond their competitive roles and allow them to understand opposing perspectives. Role-playing is a useful tool that can facilitate the mechanics of reaching consensus among diverse and competitive organizations.<sup>82</sup>

#### **CRITERIA**

There are criteria that members of the interagency operation can use to determine if the consensus building process will be successful. A good consensus building process includes representatives from all the governmental and nongovernmental organizations involved in the interagency operation. It is driven by the operational missions that are real, practical, and largely shared by the group. A good consensus building process is self-organizing and allows members of the interagency operation to collectively decide on the ground rules, objectives and discussion topics. The inherent benefits of consensus building should keep participants at the table, spur their interest, and promote learning through in-depth discussion and interaction. A good consensus building process encourages all to challenge traditional approaches and fosters creative thinking. It incorporates high-quality information of many types and seeks agreement on their meaning. A good consensus building process seeks consensus only after open dialogue has fully explored the issues and each agency's perspective on those issues. While it may not be possible for a consensus building process to fully meet all these criteria, failure to meet any one of the criteria hinders the effectiveness of the consensus building process and the quality of its outcomes.<sup>83</sup>

There are also criteria members of the interagency operation can use to determine if the results of a consensus building process will be successful. A successful consensus building process produces an agreement; it ends any stalemate. A successful consensus building process compares favorably with other methods in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. It produces a course of action that all participants understand and accept. A successful consensus building process sets in motion changes in the participants' attitudes, behaviors and actions. Finally, a successful consensus building process facilitates subsequent coordinated responses by the participants to changes in the operational environment and future crises.<sup>84</sup>

#### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS**

Understanding organizational culture and consensus building are two critical competencies needed to improve interagency operations. However, the growing civil-military philosophical and political gap may complicate civilian and military agencies' mutual understanding of each other's culture and further subvert their ability to conduct effective consensus building. Former Secretary of Defense Cohen stated: "A chasm is developing

between the military and civilian worlds, where the civilian world doesn't fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn't understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian policy makers are so short, or why the criticism is so quick and unrelenting."<sup>85</sup> This civil-military gap is widening due to the decline in veterans as a percentage of civilian society, the downsizing of the armed forces since the Cold War, and implementation of the all-volunteer force.<sup>86</sup> Volunteers have performed military service since the end of the draft in 1973. Generally, those who work in governmental and nongovernmental organizations have chosen not to serve in the military. This means the 18 to 20 year olds of the early 1970s have now become the 50 year olds of the early 2000s. This group is currently assuming leadership positions in governmental and nongovernmental organizations.<sup>87</sup> Educating the members of all participating agencies on the organizational cultures and principles of consensus building will likely be even more difficult in future interagency operations than they are today due to this growing civil-military chasm.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Military personnel involved in interagency operations do not command or control civilian interagency personnel. They must use methods such as persuasion and consensus building when dealing with governmental and nongovernmental organizations critical to mission success. These operations rely upon perceived levels of trust, shared visions, and common interests to obtain the interagency coordination needed to ensure mission objectives are achieved.<sup>88</sup> By understanding the culture of these organizations and by developing consensus-building techniques, military personnel will be able to improve interagency operations. These requisite competencies should be incorporated into service and joint doctrine.

Military personnel must understand the cultures of the civilian organizations involved in interagency operations.<sup>89</sup> The importance of understanding culture must be recognized in service and joint doctrine. The U.S. military experienced a cultural evolution in learning to conduct joint operations among the services. The armed forces expended considerable effort over the last two decades to develop doctrine to improve their ability to conduct joint operations. Similar efforts are now necessary to train military leaders to operate in the interagency environment.<sup>90</sup> To a significant degree, the services can take the same approach to improving their ability to conduct interagency operations that they did to improve their capability to undertake joint operations by developing a prescriptive doctrine that emphasizes the techniques and knowledge needed to effectively and efficiently prosecute our national security strategy.<sup>91</sup>

Similarly, consensus building is ideal for interagency operations because it facilitates reaching an agreed upon collective course of action by disparate participants. Consensus

building is a way to cope with the complexity and diversity of interagency operations. Consensus building links the distributed knowledge of all of the members of the interagency operation. Therefore it offers more knowledge and ideas for effective and acceptable courses of action development. Participants learn, gain shared understanding, break through barriers, and build trust. Consensus building leads to sophisticated solutions with motivated participants.<sup>92</sup> The importance and techniques of consensus building must be recognized and included in service and joint doctrine.

## **CONCLUSION**

The national security strategy has changed from the well-defined doctrine of containment to the uncertainty and complexity of engagement and enlargement. This new environment requires military personnel to perform their mission while almost continuously engaged in interagency operations. Operating in this environment is difficult due to the diverse cultures of participating governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Existing service and joint doctrine is of limited value in understanding how to operate in this new environment. Lessons learned from past interagency operations provide the best insight for military personnel to progress in the interagency arena. These lessons learned highlight the importance of understanding the cultures of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and the critical role of consensus building. As the civil-military gap in our society widens in the future, these requisite competencies will become all that more critical.

In his article, "Today It's Gold, Not Purple," Scott W. Moore stated, "Gold should become the color of the new paradigm for an interagency approach to complex problems. If a country team can make it happen at the local level, why not have similar organizations at the regional and national levels. Enhancing interagency entities is essential to implement solutions to complex problems."<sup>93</sup> The requisite competencies of understanding the culture of organizations and consensus building must be included in service and joint doctrine to enhance the military's role in implementing solutions to complex operations.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 8 (Summer 1995): 9.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurly, and Scott Moore, "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore," *Parameters*, 28 (Winter 1998/99): 100 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 00311723.

<sup>3</sup> William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995), 13.

<sup>4</sup> David Tucker, "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" *Parameters* 30 (Autumn 2000): 68.

<sup>5</sup> Martin R. Steele, "Deep Coalitions and Interagency Task Forces," *Naval War College Review* 52 (Winter 1999): 14.

<sup>6</sup> Tucker, 67.

<sup>7</sup> D. M. Last, "The Challenge of Interagency Cooperation in International Peace Operations: A Conference Report," *Peacekeeping & International Relations* 24 (January 1995): 5 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 11873485.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-7.

<sup>9</sup> Gibbings, Hurly, and Moore, 100.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>11</sup> Last, 6.

<sup>12</sup> Gibbings, Hurly, and Moore, 101.

<sup>13</sup> Mendel and Bradford, 14.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>16</sup> Tucker, 66.

<sup>17</sup> Michael M. Smith and Melinda Hofstetter, "Conduit or Cul-De-Sac? Information Flow in Civil-Military Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 22 (Spring 1999): 102.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>19</sup> Scott W. Moore, "Today It's Gold, Not Purple," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 20 (Autumn 1998 – Winter 1999): 103.

<sup>20</sup> Edward J. Filiberti, "National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format," *Parameters* 25 (Autumn 1995): 45.

<sup>21</sup> Last, 8.

<sup>22</sup> Mendel and Bradford, 18.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>27</sup> William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, "Interagency Cooperation: PDD56 and Complex Contingency Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 24 (Spring 2000): 93.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Norman J. Robison, *Integrated Interagency Operations: Concept to Capability*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2000), 10.

<sup>30</sup> Last, 9.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>32</sup> Gibbings, Hurly, and Moore, 104.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 104-105

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- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., 105.
- <sup>35</sup> Filiberti, 46.
- <sup>36</sup> Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 113.
- <sup>37</sup> Steele, 19.
- <sup>38</sup> Kenneth H. Pritchard, "Army and Civil-Military Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," *Army*, 47 (December 1997): 7.
- <sup>39</sup> Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Interagency Command and Control: Planning for Counterdrug Support," *Military Review* 76 (September-October 1996): 18.
- <sup>40</sup> John A. Gentry, "Complex Civil-Military Operations: A U.S. Military-Centric Perspective," *Naval War College Review* 53 (Autumn 2000): 67.
- <sup>41</sup> Schnaubelt, 18.
- <sup>42</sup> John Howard Eidenhour and Edward Marks, "Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil-Military Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 22 (Summer 1999): 87.
- <sup>43</sup> Schnaubelt, 18.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid. 21
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., 20.
- <sup>47</sup> Tucker, 73-74.
- <sup>48</sup> Smith and Hofstetter, 123.
- <sup>49</sup> Schnaubelt, 21.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid., 22.
- <sup>51</sup> Gribbings, Hurly, and Moore, 104.
- <sup>52</sup> Smith and Hofsetter, 102.
- <sup>53</sup> Schnaubelt, 23.
- <sup>54</sup> Smith and Hofsetter, 104.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>61</sup> Last, 11.
- <sup>62</sup> W. Henry Lambright, "The Rise and Fall of Interagency Cooperation: The U.S. Global Change Research Program," *Public Administration Review* 57 (January/February 1997): 41 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 00333352.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup> Susan G. Straus, "Testing a Typology of Tasks: An Empirical Validation of McGrath's (1984) Group Task Circumplex," *Small Group Research* 30 (April 1999): 166 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 10464964.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid., 168.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid., 169.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid., 169-170
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid., 170.
- <sup>70</sup> David E. Williams and Brian R. McGee, "Negotiating a Change in the Argumentation Course: Teaching Cooperative Argument," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 36 (Winter 2000):

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108 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 10511431.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 105-106

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>74</sup> Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, "Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems; A Framework for Evaluating Collaborate Planning," *American Planning Association* 65 (Autumn 1999): 414 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 01944363.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 415.

<sup>77</sup> Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, "Consensus Building as Role Playing and Bricolage: Toward a Theory of Collaborative Planning," *American Planning Association* 65 (Winter 1999): 10 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 01944363.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>83</sup> Innes and Booher, "Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems; A Framework for Evaluating Collaborate Planning," 419-420.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 420.

<sup>85</sup> Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding," *National Interest*, no. 61 (Fall 2000): 29.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>87</sup> Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process," *Armed Forces & Society* 25 (Winter 1999): 200-201.

<sup>88</sup> Gribbings, Hurley, and More, 102.

<sup>89</sup> Gentry, 65.

<sup>90</sup> Schnaubelt, 23.

<sup>91</sup> James Stavridis, "Beyond Joint, The Interagency Action," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 119 (May 1993): 97.

<sup>92</sup> Innes and Booher, "Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems; A Framework for Evaluating Collaborate Planning," 421-422.

<sup>93</sup> Moore, 105.



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